Activity 9-7 Case Analysis Approach

     We used the case analysis method to address an issue or a problem relating to Unmanned Aerial Systems as the final paper requirement for Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's ASCI 638 course - Human Factors in Unmanned Systems. Using the case analysis approach to complement the coursework enhances our comprehension of the topics we learned by applying them to existing, real time situations or issues within or outside the aviation industry to help in analyzing the problem, offering alternative solutions, and making recommendations to address the problem. As students our role in the case analysis work is to diagnose and size up the situation described in the case and then to recommend appropriate action steps. The primary objectives of the case analysis approach is to increase understanding of what should or should not work to achieve success, develop skills in organizational strengths and weaknesses assessment, practice conducting strategic analysis, evaluating alternatives, and preparing plans of action applicable in any environment, and to enhance the sense of judgment by exposure to different businesses and industries. The case analysis approach is a decision making and problem-solving tool used to thoroughly evaluate a problem or issue. It evaluates the cause, the potential consequences if no action is taken, the urgency of the situation and the priority of action, identifies solution alternatives, and establishes the reasoning behind the suggested or recommended action (Case Analysis Guidelines, 2014).
 
     The military uses a case analysis approach called the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). MDMP is an established and proven analytical process used in many aspects of military operations from training in peace time to war time situations. MDMP is an adaptation of the Army’s s analytical approach to problem solving typically used by commanders and staff in developing estimations and plans. The full MDMP is a time consuming, detailed, deliberate, and sequential process normally employed when ample time and adequate staff is available to thoroughly examine all courses of action. Its fundamentals, however, is essential for use in time-inhibited situations. Akin to the case analysis approach, MDMP analyzes multiple courses of action to identify the best solution; it creates integration, coordination, and synchronization for an operation and minimizes the risk of overlooking a critical aspect of the operation; and it results in a detailed operation order or operation plan endorsed as a consequence of the commander’s informed decision (Military Decision Making Process and Rehearsals Tool Kit, 2012).

     Both the case analysis and MDMP approach is time-consuming and better suited for team or group work. Perhaps better results are possible if the final case analysis project for this course is assigned as a group project where members of the group can collaborate and exchange ideas derived from their multiple perspectives, opinions, and experiences resulting in a far superior end product. This is, in essence, the goal of the case analysis approach.

Reference 

Case Analysis Guidelines. (2014, May 20). Retrieved from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Worldwide: https://erau.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-14470955-dt-content-rid-76772571_4/institution/Worldwide_Online/ASCI_GR_Courses/ASCI_530/From_Developer/ASCI_530_Case_Analysis%20Guidelines_Version4.pdf

Military Decision Making Process and Rehearsals Tool Kit. (2012, July 5). Retrieved from Stand-To!: http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-07-05

Human Factors, Ethics, and Morality

     Two major ethical or moral human factor issues involving the use of Unmanned Aerospace Systems (UAS) in remote warfare are responsibility and accountability. This is especially true the more autonomous UASs become and the farther human involvement seems to be in its operations, particularly in remote warfare. There are similarities between human control of unmanned and manned combat aircraft, the pilot in command (PC) makes the decision to engage the enemy in real time, the issues of accountability and responsibility rests with the pilot and, in most military operations, with those that gave the order to engage the enemy with lethal force.

     But who has responsibility and accountability when more autonomous UASs decides on its own to fly into enemy territory to engage and kill what it perceives as the enemy? Is it the PC or his commander? Is it the programmer who developed the lines of code which the UAS operates on and operators program with? Or is it the UAS itself? In principle, humans retain overall control of, and responsibility for, the machines or “robots” they create. However, it is not that simple when trying to establish the same for highly autonomous machines. Johnson and Noorman’s study on “Responsibility Practices in Robotic Warfare” (2014) discusses these key issues as it pertains to different conceptions of machine autonomy – high end automation, other than automation, or collaborative automation (p14).

     While low-end automation of machines leaves most of the operations and decisions with the human high-end automation accomplishes most of the machine operations with very little input from humans. These are processes or a series of processes that render the operations automatic (autopilot) and autonomy extends only as far as the process.

     In the concept of autonomy as something other than automation the machine performs actions directed by humans without having to be told how to do it. Humans will not have to instruct the machine on the different processes to perform in order to achieve its goal. “Machine autonomy, from this perspective, refers to robotic systems that would somehow be more flexible and unpredictable, compared to automated systems, in deciding how to operate - given predefined goals, rules, or norms.” (Johnson & Noorman, 2014). Most categorize this type of autonomy as artificial intelligence.

     Both concepts above may seem to take the human out of the loop. But in collaborative autonomy concept it is suggests that humans remain the key decision-maker in most machine functions. Most research into human-computer interaction focus on terms such as collaborative control, adaptive autonomy, or situated autonomy which stresses the receptiveness of machines to humans. In this the machine or robot seeks command from the human operator in major decisions, thereby keeping the human in the loop. This concept presents the most promise in maintaining human control ergo, responsibility and accountability, rests with the human operator of UASs used in remote warfare. UAS collaborative autonomous capabilities will greatly enhance the continued use of UAS in remote warfare in the years to come.  

Reference 

Johnson, D. G., & Noorman, M. E. (2014, May). Responsibility Practices in Robotic Warfare. Military Review, pp. 12-21. Retrieved from US Army Combined Arms Center.

UAS Crew Member Selection

     A company has purchased the Scan Eagle and Ikhana Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for its use. The Insitu Scan Eagle is a small portable UAS capable of an operational range of over 100km and an endurance of over 24 hours. A typical Scan Eagle system consists of four air vehicles, a ground control station, a remote video terminal, the SuperWedge launch system, and the Skyhook recovery system. The Scan Eagle typically requires only one operator (Scan Eagle System, 2014). The General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) Ikhana UAS is a sister UAS to the GA-ASI MQ-9 Reaper UAS. NASA originally expressed interest in the B-version of the GA-ASI Predator system and later purchased the company-named Altair variant, with a 20-foot longer wingspan and has enhanced avionics systems to better enable it to fly in FAA-controlled civil airspace and demonstrate "over-the-horizon" command and control capability from a ground station. The Ikhana is a high altitude, long endurance (HALE) UAS capable of operations longer than 24 hours at an altitude of over 40,000 feet and a payload capacity of over 400 lbs internally and over 2,000 lbs in under-wing pods (NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Ikhana/Predator B Unmanned Science and Research Aircraft System, 2014). The Ikhana requires two operators, a pilot and a sensor/payload operator, in addition to its support crew which consists of the maintenance, launch, and recovery personnel.

Crew Requirements

     The differences in operational requirements of these two UAS is a key indicator when considering crew positions which need to be filled for operations. While the Scan Eagle can be operated from start to finish by one person the Ikhana requires more personnel throughout its mission. Both UASs have more than 24 hours of endurance thus requiring at least two shifts of operators for a typical mission. Both the Scan Eagle and Ikhana should have a separate maintenance and/or launch and recovery (L&R) team from its mission operators – the air vehicle operator (AVO) and/or mission package operator (MPO) or sensor operator. The maintenance and L&R team performs preflight, launch, and recovery duties while the Mission Operations team (AVO and MPO) performs in-flight mission operations. This setup is usual in military operational use of the two platforms.

Training

GA-ASI and Insitu offers training for their respective UASs. GA-ASI’s Predator Mission Aircrew Training System (PMATS) is a highly sophisticated flight simulator that accurately reproduces MQ-9 Reaper™ pilot and sensor operator aircrew stations, allowing students to master the art of flying and operating a Predator-series UAS using actual flight hardware. GA-ASI also trains personnel on not only Predator/Gray Eagle®-series ground and airborne systems, but also flight line procedures, safety, standardization, Technical Orders (TO) utilization, and ancillary items such as first aid and CPR.  This training ensures that company and subcontract personnel are thoroughly prepared to provide quality system maintenance in any setting, from peacetime training to OCONUS warfighter support (Predator Mission Aircrew Training System, 2014).

     Insitu offers training for operators and maintainers tailored to the user’s needs. Certificate courses range from 5-weeks for maintainers to 10-weeks for operators. Additional courses in mission coordination, UAS familiarization, system upgrade, and emerging technologies are available along with Mission Employment and Instructor support packages and other additional services from Insitu (Training, 2014).

     Cross training and certifying personnel on duties such as maintenance, L&R, AVO, and MPO as well as between the Scan Eagle and Ikhana systems can be a force multiplier for the company. For example, a single maintenance crew can be trained and responsible for both systems and the AVOs and MPOs can be trained and responsible for both UAS operations.

Desired Applicant Qualifications

     Both UASs purchased by the company have been in use by the US Military for years. Veterans with training and experience on these platforms are desirable candidates for crew members. Certificates of training from each manufacturer are highly desirable, along with any FAA-mandated pilot licenses and ratings for the UAS and a minimum of 500 hours flight or maintenance/L&R time on each UAS or similar UAS.

Reference

NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Ikhana/Predator B Unmanned Science and Research Aircraft System. (2014, February 28). Retrieved from NASA: http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/news/FactSheets/FS-097-DFRC.html#.U8_0ePldWSp

Predator Mission Aircrew Training System. (2014, July 23). Retrieved from General Atomics Aeronautical: http://www.ga-asi.com/products/training_support/pmats.php

Scan Eagle System. (2014, July 23). Retrieved from INSITU: http://www.insitu.com/systems/scaneagle

Training. (2014, July 23). Retrieved from Insitu: http://www.insitu.com/services/training

Managing Risks in sUAS Operations

Operational Risk Management 

     There are several forms of hazards analysis and tools including the use of a preliminary hazards list and assessment (PHL, PHA), Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A), and an Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessment tool. The use of hazards analysis throughout an entire process helps identify and mitigate risks that may be encountered during different stages of operations.

      For the purpose of this exercise we consider the operations of a Raven small UAS (sUAS). The Raven sUAS is popular in many combat operations particularly by the US Army. The Raven is hand-launched into flight by the operator which, in spite of its small size, presents the potential for the occurrence of many incidents and accidents. We consider for analysis two critical stages in Raven operations – the staging and launch phases.

     Using MIL-STD-882D/E we can identify the Severity Categories and Probability Levels listed in Tables 1 and 2. To determine the appropriate severity category as defined in Table 1 for a given hazard at a given point in time, identify the potential for death or injury, environmental impact, or monetary loss. A given hazard may have the potential to affect one or all of these three areas (MIL-STD-882E, 2012).

     To determine the appropriate probability level as defined in Table 2 for a given hazard at a given point in time, assess the likelihood of occurrence of a mishap. Probability level F is used to document cases where the hazard is no longer present. No amount of doctrine, training, warning, caution, or Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) can move a mishap probability to level F (MIL-STD-882E, 2012).

     Assessing the risk of a task, process or action using the Probability and Severity tables, when combined, results in a value conveyed as a Risk Code which is a combination of one severity category and one probability level. As an example, a Critical severity combined with a Remote probability results in a risk code of 2D. Table 3 assigns a risk level of High, Serious, Medium, or Low for each risk code.

     Using the three tables above one can assess the Risk Level (RL) for identified hazards. As shown in Table 4 a Raven sUAS staging and launch process is broken down into identified hazards, its probability of occurrence, the severity of risk, mitigating actions that can be used to reduce the risk, and the resultant level of risk after applying mitigating actions.

     The Operational Hazards Review and Analysis is used to identify and evaluate hazards throughout the entire process or operations. The OHR&A is essential to ongoing hazards evaluation and provides the necessary feedback to assess the effectiveness of mitigating actions. Similar in form to the PHL/A, the different column in an OHR&A is the Action Review column which lists the mitigating actions identified in the PHL/A and determines if they were satisfactory (Barnhart, 2011).

     One tool commonly used in Army operations is the Composite Risk Management (CRM) worksheet which uses a Department of the Army Form #7566. The worksheet identifies the tasks, hazards, risk level, the controls or mitigating actions, the residual risk level, how to implement controls, how to supervise, who will supervise, and answers whether or not the control is effective (DA Form 7566 Risk Management Worksheet , 2005). Using the Army’s CRM worksheet as a baseline an Operational Risk Management worksheet can be fashioned for use by the Raven sUAS operators to safely assess their ability to accomplish the mission.  

 Reference 

Barnhart, R. K. (2011). Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems. London, GBR : CRC Press. DA Form 7566 Risk Management Worksheet . (2005, April). Retrieved from NCO Support: http://www.ncosupport.com/daforms/daform7566-riskmanagement.html

MIL-STD-882E. (2012). Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense.

"Who's flying this thing?"

Automatic Takeoff and Landing Systems

     Most modern passenger and cargo aircraft and some GA aircraft are equipped with automatic landing systems and some form of automatic take-off assistance to the pilot. Current popular aircraft like the Boeing 777 and its newest sister aircraft, the 787, are equipped with state-of-the-art automatic landing systems normally used by its pilots and are highly recommended for use during adverse weather or low-visibility situations (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2014). While some of the most popular unmanned aerospace systems currently in use, like the Predator and Global Hawk UAS, are capable of automated taxi, takeoff and landing, others have unique launch and recovery procedures. One such UAS is the US Army RQ-7B Shadow 200 Tactical UAS.
   
     The Shadow 200 Tactical UAS is the US Army’s premier tactical UAS used by maneuver units engaged in wartime conflict. One of the most favored assets in the field the Shadow 200 has been in use since the start of the war on terror and currently remains in use. The Shadow 200 TUAS is a small, lightweight, rapidly deployable, short-range airborne reconnaissance system designed to give the battlefield commander a day/night, multisensory collection system. The TUAS features improved connectivity to joint forces that provides needed, Near Real Time (NRT) battle information not easily obtainable from standoff airborne sensor systems, ground collection systems, or scouts. The Air Vehicle (AV) mission is to support the local commander’s Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) plan and provide the commander with NRT intelligence data in support of missions throughout the range of military operations (SHADOW 200 Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System, 2013).
   
     Shadow 200 crew members and operators undergo weeks of specialized training for their job. Because of the system’s proprietary launch and landing procedures the crew trains to respond to launch and landing emergency procedures unique to the Shadow 200 system. The Shadow 200 TUAS does not have manual alternatives to the automatic launch and landing system, the UAS pilot is not able to launch and land the AV in a conventional manner similar to manned aircraft or other UAS.

     Auto Launch System

     Rapid setup and teardown times ensure that the Shadow 200 TUAS keeps pace with brigade movements. To facilitate rapid ground force movement, AV control may be passed to other control stations or Launch/Recovery (L/R) stations while the AV is airborne. This allows the commander to conduct a series of tactical movements while still receiving continuous target coverage. The system utilizes a hydraulic launcher subsystem to facilitate launching of the AV to its operating speed in an expeditious manner, in keeping with the system’s tactical rapid deployment concept (SHADOW 200 Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System, 2013).

     The Shadow 200 TUAS LAU accomplishes AV launch by using stored energy from a nitrogen accumulator powering a hydraulic launch cylinder. The launch cylinder applies acceleration forces to the AV by a shuttle assembly, guided during launch by a guide rail, and inclined approximately 10° (8.5° deg for the High Power Launcher "HPLAU") relative to the ground. During launch, the AV, mounted on the LAU shuttle, accelerates up the guide rail pulled by a steel cable run through a series of pulleys at a 5 to 1 ratio from the rod end of the hydraulic launch cylinder. When the shuttle is in the pre-launch position, a positive latching shuttle release mechanism holds it in place. Upon receiving the launch signal, the shuttle release mechanism releases the shuttle, and the shuttle and AV accelerate up the guide rail. Acceleration forces hold the AV in the shuttle until near the end of the launch stroke, where the shuttle engages the shuttle-arresting strap (the High Power Launcher (HPLAU) uses two arresting straps), freeing the AV for launch. At that point, forward motion sends the AV airborne at a predetermined airspeed. Deactivating the Launcher with the Launcher Hand Control Unit (LHCU) causes automatic venting of residual launch pressure to the Launcher hydraulic reservoir, which renders the system safe at launch stroke completion. Following each launch completion, the shuttle is returned to the pre-launch position and latched into the shuttle release mechanism (SHADOW 200 Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System, 2013).

     The Shadow 200 AV can only be launched using the launcher; no other methods of launch exist for the system. In the event of an emergency requiring an aborted launch the following actions are performed by the crew: The crew chief (CC) announces “stand by” to hold the crew on present conditions, then releases the launch switch from Launch to Hold; if AV fails to launch after two tries the CC announces “launch fail” to the crew and alert every one of the emergency and then closes the switch cover to prevent accidental launch; the crew then stops launcher pressurization and begins depressurization procedures, performs complete shutdown procedures to investigate the cause of the failed launch.

Auto Landing System

     Shadow 200 uses the Tactical Automatic Landing System (TALS). The TALS provides automatic landing guidance and control for the AV. The TALS is divided into two subsystems: the Airborne Subsystem (AS) and the Track Subsystem (TS). The AS is contained within the AV and consists of an AS Transponder and AS Antenna. The TS remains on the ground and consists of a Track Control Unit (TCU), an Interrogator unit, an Antenna/Radome and a Pedestal unit. The TCU contains software that flies the AV during automatic recovery. The TALS subsystems provide precise position information required for automatic AV recovery. The subsystems provide near all-weather, day and night, position-sensing capability. The AS provides a unique point of reference on the AV, enabling the TS to detect and precisely track the AV. The TS measures the AV position relative to the Touch Down Point (TDP). The TS is capable of tracking an AV (with an AS) at a maximum distance of approximately 2.4 miles (3.9 km), 2.1 nautical miles (nmi) in worse case environmental conditions (i.e., rain) (SHADOW 200 Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System, 2013).

     In the event of TALS failures which can be a TALS abort below decision point or a TALS recovery failure (e.g. loss link, failure to acquire, etc.) the Shadow 200 is equipped with a POP300 chute recovery system. When TALS failure occurs and no remedial action regains its use to safely land the AV the crew performs emergency recovery procedures which includes flying the AV to a designated rendezvous point, cutting the engine power, and deploying the recovery chute to bring the AV back to ground in the safest way possible, preserving the AV and its payload for future use.  

Reference 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes. (2014, July 10). Retrieved from Boeing: http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/787family/index.page?

SHADOW 200 Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System. (2013). Washington, D.C.: US Army.

Predator Shift Work

Activity 5-4 Research – Shift Work Schedule  

     Numerous studies acknowledge the recuperative benefits of sleep. The value of good sleep is advantageous to overall well-being and especially helpful to the working class. Poor sleep habits or insufficient amounts of sleep manifest itself as fatigue or signs of degradation in the quality work. Data derived from the studies show regular amounts of quality sleep prior to work is essential to high quality performance and alertness in the workplace and promotes recovery from fatigue. Alternately, disruptions to a body’s normal circadian rhythm caused by shifting work schedule can have a cumulative negative effect requiring days to recover and return to normal rhythm (Orlady & Orlady, 2008). 
     
In support of a US Air Force MQ-1 Predator Squadron’s 24/7 mission, the UAS crews have been separated into 4 teams and put onto a continuous shift work schedule of 6 days on, 2 days off. Concerns over reports of extreme fatigue while conducting operations, and complaints of inadequate sleep due to the current shift schedule (Table 1) have been raised by the Squadron Commander who is requiring a change in the shift schedule while maintaining 24/7 coverage. At a glance this shift schedule shows a quick, forward-moving shift rotation every eight days. While the clockwise, forward-moving shift rotation is ideal and recommended because it is easier to change the sleep/wake cycle following a natural adaptive pattern of delaying the sleep schedule (Thorpy, 2010), the ratio between work and rest periods does not allow for enough recuperative sleep between rotations. Additionally, the rapid changeover in shifts disrupts the body’s ability to adapt to the change, causing an aggregate negative sleep-debt effect. 

Table 1. 6 On 2 Off Rotating Shift Schedule

Proposed Schedule 

     Given the 24/7 nature of the mission it is important to consider introducing more days off and less consecutive work days into the shift rotation. Giving workers extended time away from the job environment aids in recuperation and breaks the monotony of the extended work week of the previous shift schedule. An alternating [3-days on / 3-days off] – [2-days on / 2-days off] rotating shift schedule (Table 2) not only minimizes the consecutive number of work days but also provides an equal number of days off following each work shift. Increasing the number of hours worked in each shift to 12 hours is negligible because of the proposed schedule’s short duration, giving ample reciprocal days off in between shifts. 

Table 2. Alternating [3 On / 3 Off] – [2 On / 2 Off] Rotating Shift Schedule

     Mott et al. (1965) found that many consecutive evening or night shifts could impair the marital happiness of shift workers and may have negative effects on the school performance of children whose parents are both shift workers. To address this issue the schedule rotates after the third week to allow Teams 1 and 2 to rotate shifts with Teams 3 and 4. Additionally, the schedule allows each team to have up to three traditional weekends (Saturday and Sunday) off each month. Studies showed that weekends off were favored higher than weekdays, and time off in the evenings are desirable than time off during the day (Wedderburn 1981; Hornberger and Knauth 1993). If followed correctly this proposed schedule should allow more time for quality rest and recuperation while lessening the effects of fatigue brought about by the previous schedule.

Reference

Hornberger, S., & Knauth, P. (1993). Interindividual differences on the subjective evaluation of leisure time utility.

Mott, P. E., Mann, F. C., McLoughlin, Q., & Warwick, D. P. (1965). Shift Work: The Social, Psychological and Physical Consequences. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Orlady, H. W., & Orlady, L. M. (2008). Human Factors in Multi-Crew Flight Operations. Burlington: Ashgate.

Thorpy, M. J. (2010, January). Managing the patient with shift-work disorder. Retrieved from The Journal of Family Practice: http://media.mycme.com/documents/29/culpepper_2010_swd_suppl_7021.pdf

Wedderburn, A. (1981). Is there a pattern in the value of time off work? . Pergamon: Oxford.